Verify an
energy attestation.
Anyone can check this certificate independently.
Cryptographic signatures · independent hardware sensors · on-chain anchor.
Verification scope and independent checks
The layers above read the verification result from Serial Alice's
public, no-auth endpoints. The issuer's public key is published at
/v2/issuers — a registry you can mirror — so anyone can re-check the
certificate's hash and Ed25519 signature independently. Trust posture and
confidence score describe the evidence recorded at issuance. Evidence can
include component telemetry, a signed exporter, a host fingerprint and a TEE.
These are different guarantees; cryptographic validity alone does not establish
physical measurement accuracy. Each evidence flag is part of the signed
canonical payload, so flipping any one of them invalidates the signature.
Signing key custody says where the keys that signed the certificate live.
With tee, they were generated inside an Intel TDX trust domain running a sealed
image, and the platform adopted them only after the TDX quote verified to Intel's root and the
image measurements matched a published allowlist. The raw quote and its bindings are published
at /v2/verify/key-attestation/{key_id}. Each signature is numbered in the signer's
hash-chained log (/v2/verify/signer-log/head). Custody shows who could sign; it does
not establish the measured energy.
When a certificate is anchored, its leaf is included in a batch root.
The expected transaction calldata reads
SERIAL-ALICE-BATCH:<batch_id>:<merkle_root> — Polygon itself
lets an independent verifier check the commitment and inclusion proof.
This page reports the API's anchor status; it does not query Polygon RPC.
Download the available bundle to check its certificate and proof material independently. Availability is not an offline verification result. Establish trust in the issuer key separately; checking an on-chain commitment independently also requires trusted chain evidence.