Alice Benchmark v2.0

The Trust Score Ladder.

Five progressive tests. Expected scores under trust-score-v2. Most AI energy claims stop at Test 1.

trust-score-v2 · expected scores
TEST 1
0.00 Self Reported
most benchmarks stop here
TEST 5
1.00 HW Attested

The complete ladder

Five trust levels — computed deterministically from the evidence flags present in each certificate.

Test
Score
Posture
Certificate
Scores shown are the expected trust-score-v2 values for each test configuration. Each ↗ verify opens a real production certificate holding the same trust posture — its own score reflects its own evidence, live from the public API. Certificates signed under trust-score-v1 keep their signed score.
test1
0.00
SELF REPORTED
Dual Source (NVML × RAPL) Signed Exporter Machine Fingerprint TEE Quote (Intel TDX / AMD SEV-SNP)
test2
0.15
CROSS CHECKED
Dual Source (NVML × RAPL) Signed Exporter Machine Fingerprint TEE Quote (Intel TDX / AMD SEV-SNP)
+ signed exporter · machine identity
test3
0.45
CROSS CHECKED
Dual Source (NVML × RAPL) Signed Exporter Machine Fingerprint TEE Quote (Intel TDX / AMD SEV-SNP)
test4
0.65
CROSS CHECKED
Dual Source (NVML × RAPL) Signed Exporter Machine Fingerprint TEE Quote (Intel TDX / AMD SEV-SNP)
+ hardware root of trust (TEE)
test5
1.00
HW ATTESTED
Dual Source (NVML × RAPL) Signed Exporter Machine Fingerprint TEE Quote (Intel TDX / AMD SEV-SNP)

What each layer proves

Layer Points What it proves Adversary required to fake
Independent Meter +0.40 An independent physical meter (PDU, branch circuit, facility or BMC) corroborates the reported power. The one source the audited operator cannot fake from inside the host. Control of a meter outside the audited host
TEE Quote +0.40 Hardware-rooted attestation (Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP — live in production; AWS Nitro planned). Proves a genuine TEE committed to the samples. Alone it reaches only cross_checked: it does not identify the code that measured. CPU vendor silicon break
Signed Exporter +0.30 The exporter response carried a verified Ed25519 signature. Cryptographic exporter integrity, on the host side. Theft of the exporter signing key
Machine Fingerprint +0.20 The exporter's machine identity matches the agent's. Binds the reading to a host. Control of the host's identity
Dual Source +0.15 NVML and RAPL agree. Both are counters on the audited host, so this is internal consistency, not independent truth. Control of the audited host
MAXIMUM 1.00 Weights sum to 1.45 and the score is clamped at 1.00. Signatures, Merkle proofs and the Polygon anchor protect the record after signing and add no points.

Posture thresholds

score < 0.40
self_reported
Single energy source, no cross-check. Better than a spreadsheet — not independently verifiable at hardware level.
score ≥ 0.40
cross_checked
Partial evidence: NVML × RAPL agreement alone, a single TEE quote, or host-side evidence up to 0.65. Stronger than self-reported, short of two independent pieces of evidence.
score ≥ 0.80
hardware_attested
Two independent pieces of evidence, such as a TEE quote and a corroborating meter. Forging the certificate requires control of both.

Verify any certificate

No account. No API key. No reliance on our declaration alone.

curl https://api.serialalice.pt/v2/certificates/{cert_id}/verify \
  | jq '.trust_posture, .trust_model.trust_score'
Open public verifier →